Recalling hydraulic despotism:Hun sen's Cambodia and the return of strict authoritarianism by Blake, David J.H.
ASEAS 12(1) | 69
Recalling Hydraulic Despotism: Hun Sen’s Cambodia and the 
Return of Strict Authoritarianism
David J. H. Blake
► Blake, D. J. H. (2019). Recalling hydraulic despotism: Hun Sen’s Cambodia and the return of strict 
authoritarianism. Austrian Journal of South-East Asian Studies, 12(1), 69-89.
Mirroring trends elsewhere in Southeast Asia, Cambodia has witnessed a pronounced 
shift towards stricter authoritarianism over recent years. The state appears more firmly 
ruled by prime minister Hun Sen than at any time during the past three decades, while the 
de facto status of the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) more closely resembles the single 
party regimes of neighboring states. One of the major tools of political control and ex-
pansion of authority employed by the hierarchical CPP network is the construction of 
major infrastructure projects, most notably hydropower dams and irrigation schemes. 
This article focuses attention on the hydraulic infrastructure aspects of exacting political 
authority and social control by the elite over the nation, drawing upon Wittfogelian per-
spectives for a conceptual framework. It maintains that Cambodia increasingly represents 
a modern variant of a hydraulic society, but primarily functions as a satellite hydraulic 
state of China. The growing influence of China over Cambodia’s hydraulic development 
has helped elevate Hun Sen to resemble a neo-classic hydraulic despot. Hydraulic society 
concepts help provide partial understanding of contemporary power relations and party-
state ascendency, including the longevity and resilience of Hun Sen’s supremacy.
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
INTRODUCTION
Over the course of 2017-18, Cambodia demonstrably shifted towards a consid-
erably harsher form of authoritarian governance, with several senior political 
opponents to the incumbent regime jailed, intimidated, exiled, or threatened 
with violence amidst a general crackdown on pro-democratic groups, free 
speech, and civil liberties (Morgenbesser, 2019). There was a rise in the use of 
extra-legal violence against environmental and human rights activists, includ-
ing several state-linked assassinations, while a climate of impunity was widely 
recognized to be the norm for members of Cambodia’s well-connected elite who 
had been implicated in a range of alleged crimes. This is not to imply that any 
of these symptoms of “hegemonic authoritarianism” (Morgenbesser, 2019) were 
not previously present, but merely that the indicator gauge of democratic free-
doms had lurched further into the red zone, and few observers held any illusions 
that there would be a rapid reversal. The trend in Cambodia matches a gen-
eral trend seen across Southeast Asia towards an authoritarian “problem region” 
(Einzenberger & Schaffer, 2018, p. 2; Pongsudhirak, 2018) and, indeed, a wider 
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global pattern of more populist, nationalist, and authoritarian regimes (Freedom 
House, 2017). This retreat of democracy is mirrored by a notable rise in personalist 
dictatorships, defined as regimes where power is highly concentrated in the hands of 
a single individual, changing from 23% in 1988 up to 40% of authoritarian regimes 
in 2017 (Kendall-Taylor, Frantz, & Wright, 2017). This rise in authoritarianism comes 
at a time when the development of hydraulic infrastructure has been accelerating 
across the Mekong region, with China being the main investor.
This article begins by examining Cambodia’s recent shift towards a stricter form 
of authoritarianism, arguing that this should be viewed as part of a longer historical 
trend, in part reflecting the ostensible failure of Western attempts to liberalize and 
democratize Cambodia (Un, 2011). This failure cannot be separated from the paral-
lel assertion of economic and political hegemony by China throughout the Mekong 
region, showing its strongest expression in Cambodia in the throes of being trans-
formed into a bulwark state for Chinese state expansionist interests over resources on 
land and at sea, raising concerns of neo-colonialism (Caceres & Ear, 2013). The article 
posits that examining these political developments through a lens that acknowl-
edges Wittfogel’s (1957) hydraulic society thesis – in particular claims that such states 
are generally ruled by autocratic leaders he labelled as “hydraulic despots” – would 
allow for a more nuanced way of understanding some of the inherent socio-political 
dynamics and processes at work in contemporary Cambodia, both internally and 
at the level of inter-state relationships. Adopting this conceptual framework allows 
for an examination of the contention that a key tool and mechanism used by the 
increasingly centralized state to enact its authority over the nation, particularly its 
periphery, is via the construction of hydraulic infrastructure, especially hydropower 
and irrigation schemes. The timeframe examined is primarily the post-Khmer Rouge 
period since Hun Sen’s rise to power, with a strong emphasis on events of the last dec-
ade. Taking this line of argumentation further, the article proposes that Cambodia is 
moving incrementally towards becoming a satellite hydraulic state of China, doing 
its bidding on the regional geopolitical stage in return for political gifts and favors to 
the elite, a cultural practice that aids Hun Sen’s personalized, neopatrimonial style of 
political rule (Un, 2011). The article is based on an extensive literature review, sup-
ported by the author’s empirical observations in several provinces of recent hydraulic 
infrastructure developments during field visits between 2017 and 2018.
CAMBODIA’S RECENT SHIFT TO PERSONALIZED AUTHORITARIANISM
The slide towards deeper authoritarianism in Cambodia culminated during the run 
up to the 2018 general elections. The main opposition party to the ruling Cambodian 
People’s Party (CPP), the Cambodian National Rescue Party (CNRP) was dissolved 
on 16 November 2017 by the Supreme Court, while 118 of its senior members were 
banned from politics for 5 years and its 55 National Assembly seats were redistributed 
to the CPP (Sutton, 2017). The CNRP’s former leader, Kem Sokha, was accused of 
conspiring with foreign governments to overthrow the incumbent regime and was 
arrested on 3 September 2017 on charges of “treason and espionage” (Agence France-
Presse, 2017). Leading Hun Sen opponent, Sam Rainsy, was earlier forced into exile in 
France and has little chance of being granted a safe return to Cambodia to rejoin the 
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political fray. In the June 2017 commune council elections the CNRP won 44% of the 
national vote, a result which was perceived to have rattled the confidence of the CPP 
about its chances of outright victory at the 29 July 2018 general elections.1 Sutton 
(2017) argues that the deliberate break-up of the CNRP marked a “turning point” in 
Cambodian politics, from “a system that was relatively balanced at the elite level into 
a personalist dictatorship centred on Hun Sen”. He notes the death of King Norodom 
Sihanouk in 2012, then the demise of Senate president Chea Sim who commanded a 
powerful internal faction in June 2015, followed by the quashing of the CNRP, have 
allowed Hun Sen an opportunity to consolidate and expand his already formidable 
power base. Hun Sen has been quick to shrug off any foreign accusation of a power 
grab. Reacting to EU threats to impose sanctions on Cambodia, potentially freeze the 
overseas assets of senior officials, and remove Cambodia’s preferential trade status 
in the Everything But Arms agreement over the dissolution of the CNRP, Hun Sen 
berated the EU by stating, 
when we break the legs of their children, who robbed and stole things from us 
. . . the father will be furious . . . The father is furious because his children got 
broken legs while they crawled to set bombs in our house (Sokhean & Kijeswki, 
2017). 
Hun Sen’s reference to “the children” was apparently aimed at the CNRP leader-
ship whom he accused of fomenting “revolution”, supposedly with the help of the EU 
and US. The use of extreme metaphors and even direct threats of violence by Hun Sen 
have become increasingly commonplace in recent years. For example, during a rally 
for garment workers in late November 2017, Hun Sen claimed that he would have 
assassinated opposition leaders Sam Rainsy and Kem Sokha, had he watched a video 
from 29 December 2013 in which the two had apparently called on the large crowds 
at a non-violent protest to “organize a new government” and contest the close-run 
result of the earlier general elections (Niem & Chen, 2017). Hun Sen is quoted in the 
same source as saying, 
if I had seen that at the time they would already be dead; it would be their fu-
neral. They are lucky that I missed it. If I had watched that clip on the day they 
announced that, a few hours later, I would have attacked from all sides at once 
(Niem & Chen, 2017).
The same article reported that during the run up to the 2017 commune elections, 
Hun Sen had threatened “to eliminate 100 to 200 people” in the event of protests against 
the result, claiming this would be in the interests of national stability and security.
Simultaneously with the extensive and systematic persecution of political oppo-
sition figures and parties, Hun Sen has waged an unrelenting attack against civil 
society, including attempts to silence media outlets deemed unsympathetic to him, 
while threatening certain outspoken NGOs with violence, censure, and closure. For 
1 In the event, the CPP won by a landslide, taking all 125 seats in the National Assembly and 76.9% of the 
popular vote. FUNCINPEC, the closest party to CPP gained just 5.89% of the vote, amidst widespread claims 
that the election had been “a sham” (Morgenbesser, 2018a; Prak Chan Thul, 2018b).
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example, the Cambodian Center for Human Rights (CCHR), founded by Kem Sokha, 
incurred the wrath of Hun Sen at a November 2017 rally, stating that the center 
“must close because they follow foreigners” (Sokhean, 2017). Two months earlier, 
the government forced the Cambodia Daily newspaper to cease operations after 24 
years of independent journalism, claiming it owed a USD 6.3 million tax bill (Baliga 
& Chheng, 2017). The final edition of the paper ran with the headline, “Descent into 
Outright Dictatorship”. Its closure coincided with a state clampdown on other print 
and broadcast media sources such as Radio Free Asia, Voice of America, and Voice 
of Democracy, amongst 15 domestic radio stations ordered shut by the Ministry of 
Information (Dara & Baliga, 2017). The remaining English language daily, the Phnom 
Penh Post, is now run by a Malaysian businessman with alleged connections to Hun 
Sen (Styllis, 2018). 
By the end of 2017, accusations that Cambodia was sliding towards a fully-fledged 
dictatorship or autocratic state appeared more frequently in mainstream media 
sources (e.g., Hoekstra, 2017; Hurst, 2017; Ward, 2017). Hun Sen has shown strong 
indications that he aims to establish a ruling family dynasty by appointing several 
of his sons and other family members to key positions within the government and 
military (Morgenbesser, 2019; Strangio, 2014). Cambodia has been recognized as one 
of the most dangerous countries in the world for grassroots human rights and envi-
ronmental activists, following systematic state intimidation and violence directed 
towards innumerable activists over recent years, a reality reinforced by the 2012 
murder of prominent forest defender Chut Wutty at the hands of a military police 
officer (Parnell, 2015) and the assassination of political activist Kem Ley in July 2016 
(Morgenbesser, 2019). In January 2018, a court jailed two environmental activists 
with the NGO Mother Earth for filming suspected illegal sand mining activity in Koh 
Kong province (Prak Chan Thul, 2018a). 
While it seems apparent that Cambodia has become decidedly more authoritarian 
over the last few years, with Hun Sen more firmly at the helm than ever and driving 
forward new hydraulic mega-projects, how best to conceptually account for this shift 
towards a more centralized bureaucratic and patrimonial polity? Einzenberger and 
Schaffar (2018) point to the possibility that China may be serving as a role model 
for nearby countries, in part through its economic engagement and desire for polit-
ical stability. The article proceeds by offering a brief recap of the general theory of 
hydraulic society via a consideration of Wittfogel’s claims concerning the peculiar 
quasi-theocratic nature of despotic rulers that I maintain takes on some relevance to 
the contemporary Cambodian context.
WITTFOGEL’S HYDRAULIC SOCIETY THESIS REVISITED
Wittfogel (1957/1981) originally theorized that control of water through large-scale 
irrigation and other hydraulic works was the basis of a peculiarly “Asiatic mode of pro-
duction”2 and accompanied the rise of an attendant, powerful, and exploitative ruling 
2 Wittfogel devotes an entire chapter in Oriental Despotism to an analysis of “The rise and fall of the 
theory of the Asiatic mode of production” (Chapter 9), calling for its re-examination, based on the twenti-
eth century rise of totalitarian states under the banner of ‘Marxism-Leninism’.
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class (termed the “hydraulic bureaucracy”). Following emigration from Germany to 
the United States prior to the Second World War, Wittfogel started to substitute the 
phrase “Oriental society” with “hydraulic society” to indicate the water controlling 
mode of production and its associated social order, although he retained the former 
term in the title of his magnum opus, Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study of Total 
Power, inviting criticisms of cultural determination or orientalism3 (e.g., Robbins, 
2004). Control of water for irrigation expansion purposes took on special significance 
in the emergence of certain early Asian societies centered on rivers flowing through 
semi-arid or arid environments, which differed fundamentally from the more feu-
dalistic development pathway of most early European states, which were mostly 
based on rainfed agriculture. According to the theory, only a powerful and complex 
state organization can manage the multiple activities and problems associated with 
large-scale irrigated agriculture, such as its planning, construction, enlargement, 
operation, and maintenance, the allocation of water between upstream and down-
stream cultivators; the arbitration of conflicts, and tax collection functions. The 
hydraulic state occupied a position of “unrivalled operational leadership and organ-
izational control” over the construction of productive and protective public works, 
plus the labor force required to build them (Peet, 1985, p. 8). Furthermore, Wittfogel 
maintained the highly centralized power afforded by technological control of water 
resources resulted in fundamentally despotic forms of governance found in such 
early hydraulic civilizations as Egypt, China, Mesopotamia, Sri Lanka, the Indus val-
ley, and pre-Columbian Mexico and Peru.4 Absolutism was presumed to be the norm, 
while civil society was characteristically poorly developed and routinely oppressed 
wherever it appeared. Wittfogel noted that these societies demonstrated particular 
class differentiations, labor divisions, and specialization typical of centralized urban 
life within a limited core area, surrounded by large interstitial and peripheral areas 
connected to the center. 
Wittfogel (1981) maintained that a defining feature of any hydraulic society was 
the presence of an autocratic emperor, pharaoh, or king (often revered as a semi-di-
vine deity), who would be responsible for playing “the decisive role in initiating, 
accomplishing, and perpetuating the major works of hydraulic economy” (p. 27). He 
referred to the existence of an organizational web for managing the hydraulic works 
covering the whole, or at least the “dynamic core” of the nation; emphasizing that 
“those who control this network are uniquely prepared to wield supreme political 
power” (p. 27). In considering the nature of the power of the leader of a hydraulic 
society, Wittfogel described it as “benevolent in form, oppressive in content” (p. 136) 
and noted an absence of effective constitutional or societal checks on its absolutism. 
Consequently, the ruler tends to “expand his authority through alliances, maneuvers, 
and ruthless schemes until, having conquered all other centers of supreme decision, 
he alone prevails” (Wittfogel, 1981, p. 107).
3 In fact, Wittfogel identifies a number of societies lying outside the classical ‘orient’ in his classification 
scheme of hydraulic societies, including several in Central and South America. 
4 It should be acknowledged that Wittfogel makes no mention of the Khmer empire or Cambodia in 
Oriental Despotism, suggesting he had not studied the nation in any detail and offered no opinion as to 
its hydraulic credentials.
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THE (RE-)EMERGENCE OF A HYDRAULIC SOCIETY IN MODERN CAMBODIA RE-
FLECTED IN HUN SEN’S RISE 
Most critiques of Wittfogel’s concepts concerning Southeast Asia have primarily been 
interested in the context of pre-modern societies, usually paying scant attention to 
the theory’s applicability to contemporary nation states and modern geopolitics. 
Price (1994) noted a tendency for some anthropologists studying irrigation to ignore 
Wittfogel’s work “or to merely cite it to dismiss it instantly as ‘reductionistic’, ‘simplis-
tic’, or ‘mechanical’” (p. 193). Also referring to a slew of scholarly dismissals, Worster5 
(1992) maintained that 
one of the most serious weaknesses in that literature [anthropological schol-
arship of the 1960s and 70s], it must be said straight off, is that the modern 
experience with irrigation hardly appears in it. Nowhere do the ecological an-
thropologists – nor does Wittfogel for that matter – seem to realise that the link 
between water control and social power might occur in places other than the 
archaic cradles of civilization nor that the past hundred years have seen more 
irrigation development than all of previous history (p. 30).
This criticism of a failure to consider the modern context could equally apply 
to some anthropological portrayals of Cambodia that have stoked a long-running 
debate regarding the validity of the hydraulic society hypothesis to the formation 
of the ancient Khmer empire (e.g., Rigg, 1992). While it is now generally accepted 
amongst academics that the impressive reservoir structures (known as barai) around 
Angkor were unlikely to have been built for irrigation, but rather for domestic water 
supply and more significantly, theocratic displays of power and religious symbolism 
(Mabbett & Chandler, 1995; van Liere, 1980), the irrigation trope is now part of modern 
Khmer folklore. The lack of an irrigational purpose has not prevented contemporary 
powerful irrigation promoters from regularly invoking the memory and symbols of 
Angkor kings in speeches and development propaganda (Hughes, 2006). Rather than 
disturbing historical constructions concerning early state formation, this article is 
primarily concerned with examining the modern Cambodian state since the end of 
the Khmer Rouge regime (1975-79), a period when wildly ambitious, poorly designed, 
and ecologically illiterate irrigation schemes were built with the technical assistance 
of Chinese advisors and the forced labor of tens of thousands of citizens, only to fail 
alongside the regime’s own disintegration (Himel, 2007). But it is the late 20th and 
early 21st century experience of concerted hydraulic infrastructure expansion, the 
emergence of an increasingly centralized bureaucracy, and the CPP hierarchy pursu-
ing a more subtle form of irrigation-driven social engineering than the Khmer Rouge 
employed, that warrants closer scrutiny with regards to the nature of contemporary 
modes of hydraulic governance. 
5 Worster’s (1992) book Rivers of Empire: Water, Aridity and the Growth of the American West documents 
the extent to which the irrigation development paradigm of the modern “hydraulic West” has resulted in 
extensive ecological damage, a reallocation of power (as well as water) to bureaucratic and corporate elites, 
and societal conflict.
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In discussing the nature of archetypal sovereigns ruling over hydraulic societies, 
Wittfogel noted how power was invariably concentrated and operationalized through 
a single, absolute leader: 
In his person the ruler combines supreme operational authority and the many 
magic and mythical symbols that express the terrifying (and allegedly benefi-
cial) qualities of the power apparatus he heads. Because of immaturity, weak-
ness, or incompetence, he may share his operational supremacy with an aide: 
a regent, vizier, chancellor, or ‘prime minister’. But the exalted power of these 
men does not usually last long. It rarely affects the symbols of supreme author-
ity. (Wittfogel, 1957, p. 305)
For most Cambodians born after 1980 (in other words the vast majority, given the 
relative demographic youth of the nation), Hun Sen has been the only national leader 
they have known. He is regarded as a consummate and skillful politician through-
out his career, carefully plotting a rise to power, by ruthlessly out-maneuvering rival 
factions and individuals at each stage to ensure no one can seriously threaten his 
personal supremacy (Morgenbesser, 2018b). As Strangio (2014) notes, Hun Sen has 
played many roles during his three decades at the apex of the Cambodian political 
hierarchy, including “apparatchik and reformer, strongman and statesman, dem-
agogue and free-wheeling marketer” (p. xiii). Yet beyond these external guises, he 
stresses that Hun Sen has “ruled in the traditional Cambodian way, through a system 
of personal patronage in which money was passed upwards in exchange for protec-
tion” (p. xiii), displaying a personality that offered little tolerance for internal dissent, 
with a penchant for unpredictable behavior and violence when rattled. 
It is pertinent to note that Hun Sen arose from relatively humble beginnings 
to assume the prime ministership and at one time was a Khmer Rouge cadre, yet 
now blithely assumes the honorific title Samdech Akka Moha Sena Padei Techo, 
which roughly translates as “Illustrious Prince, Great Supreme Protector, and Famed 
Warrior” (Strangio, 2014, p. 116). He has actively encouraged the (re)creation of a 
hierarchical bureaucratic and parallel societal structure that recalls an absolute royal 
past, evident, for instance, in state propaganda in which the official narrative increas-
ingly paints him as a near-legendary, rags-to-riches “peasant king” (Strangio, 2014, 
p. 117-119). In the manner of an Angkorian god-king, he has begun to bestow the 
equivalent of royal ranks to generous benefactors from the Cambodian elite, such as 
the title okhna to anyone contributing over USD 100,000 for the purpose of “national 
reconstruction”.
Hun Sen’s Hold Over the CPP Strengthens and the Shift to a Hydraulic Paradigm
Formerly known as the Kampuchean People’s Revolutionary Party (KPRP), the CPP’s 
rise to prominence dates back to the 1980s period of civil war and domestic chaos, as 
the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) and Western gov-
ernments slowly returned with financial aid, development projects, and the promise 
76 | ASEAS 12(1)
Recalling Hydraulic Despotism
of democracy.6 Donors showed considerable interest in financially supporting a slew 
of irrigation development schemes as a key component of returning the country 
to some degree of socio-economic ‘normalcy’ and peace, even though consultants’ 
reports often cautioned against pushing too rapid an expansion of infrastructure, 
on account of a raft of technical, environmental, economic, and political risk factors 
(Blake, 2016). Invariably their words of caution were not heeded, with entirely new 
irrigation systems built or Khmer Rouge era systems rehabilitated and expanded, 
only to quickly fall into disrepair or be abandoned due to myriad technical deficien-
cies (Treffner, 2010).
Through the 1980s and 90s, the CPP emerged as the party most experienced and 
skilled at harnessing foreign donor-funded infrastructural development aid to benefit 
its own narrow interests, both as a political party and in terms of individual economic 
advancement. Simply put, the more senior the position attained in the party hier-
archy, the greater the sense of entitlement to the spoils of development came with 
that office, with authority over infrastructure projects being regarded as a key reward 
within an entrenched patron-client gifting culture (Hughes, 2006; Norén-Nilsson, 
2016; Roberts, 2002). As McCargo (2005) has argued, the CPP held virtual hegemony 
over Cambodian politics during the start of the 21st century, and any transition to a 
liberal democracy was largely illusory and wishful thinking on the part of the inter-
national community. During several coalition governments, the CPP usually ensured 
that its politicians controlled the most lucrative and influential government bureau-
cracies, including agriculture, forestry, and water resources agencies, after which it 
would stuff the agencies with followers in a nepotistic manner, carving out a solid 
fiefdom for personal enrichment (Un, 2005). In Cambodia, as is the case in Thailand 
(Blake, 2016), irrigation projects are invariably considered, on the one hand an inte-
gral component of an electoral strategy employed by politicians to offer rural people 
an incentive to vote for them, and on the other hand a means for elites to reward loyal 
bureaucrats, contractors, party members, and politicians (depending on their posi-
tion within the patron-client hierarchy) through mutual rent-seeking opportunities 
during the scheme’s construction (Blake, 2019; Sok, 2012). Following the 2008-09 
spike in paddy prices, the CPP referred to itself as “the irrigation party” (Thavat, 2006) 
and has in subsequent elections repeatedly promised rural voters greater prosper-
ity from the construction of irrigation schemes that would supposedly allow double 
cropping of rice (Blake, 2016). Having de facto control over much of the bureaucracy, 
in particular the Ministry of Water Resources and Meteorology (MoWRAM) and the 
Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF), has allowed the CPP to exer-
cise control over water flows, people, and development funds (whether domestic or 
international aid), with little interest in questions of equity, sustainability, or the 
environment (Venot & Fontenelle, 2018). The personalization of political elite gifting 
practices is epitomized by CPP posters featuring paternalistic images of Hun Sen and 
Heng Samrin7 situated above pictures of state-funded infrastructure projects, includ-
ing irrigation canals, that seemed ubiquitous in the countryside during the run-up 
6 The KPRP formally changed its name to the CPP in 1991, less than a week before the signing of the Paris 
Peace Accords established the UNTAC and paved the way for ‘free’ elections in Cambodia (Frings, 1995). 
7 Heng Samrin was a former army commander in the Khmer Rouge, general secretary of the KPRP from 
1981 to 1991 and has been President of the National Assembly of Cambodia since 2006. 
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to the July 2018 elections. The CPP posters dominated those of minor party rivals 
in size and frequency, seen next to both relatively small irrigation projects, such as 
one funded by Australia in Prey Kabbas district, Takeo province (Blake, 2018a), and 
a Chinese-funded mega-project (albeit failed) in Prey Veng province (Blake, 2018b). 
That Hun Sen’s party swept the board in every constituency was not surprising and 
points to the emergence of a hydraulic society, where all public infrastructure is ulti-
mately associated with a single ruler and party.
With regards to the potential for national harm caused by poorly planned hydrau-
lic development (both domestically and internationally), it is salient to note the 
quixotic nature of Hun Sen. This is reflected in a switch from adopting a rhetorical 
position of mild opposition towards large-scale hydraulic developments upstream on 
the Mekong river in the early years of the 21st century, including those in China, to 
offering unreserved support and even contemplating building its own ‘mega-dams’ 
on the mainstream Mekong in recent years, presumably reflecting altered geopolit-
ical loyalties as main funding sources have changed. While it is most unlikely that 
he personally wrote the opening address for the Second International Symposium 
on the Management of Large Rivers for Fisheries held in Phnom Penh in February 
2003, it is still instructive that Hun Sen stated that in terms of the Mekong hydraulic 
development, “continued upstream dam construction” and a “commercial naviga-
tion plan” were “a major concern” to Cambodia’s interests, creating a worry that “the 
Tonle Sap could dry up, ending the famous river fishing industry” (Hun Sen, 2003). 
However, even while the threats from upstream have increased, such concerns 
for potential social and environmental damage seem to have vanished in recent 
years, with Hun Sen ostensibly silent about major upstream riverine schemes, just 
at the time that (mostly) Chinese-funded hydraulic developments have blossomed 
in Cambodia and new plans are regularly being proposed. He has also advocated 
staunchly in favor of a mainstream dam just across the border in Laos, which a wide 
range of stakeholders have warned could be disastrous to fish migrations in the entire 
lower Mekong system (Boer et al., 2016). Since an announcement by the Laos gov-
ernment of the development of the 256 MW Don Sahong dam in 2014, civil society 
actors and Cambodian government officials have publicly expressed worries about 
the potential negative impacts this project might have on local communities reli-
ant on eco-tourism and the wider Mekong ecosystem, in particular the agriculture 
and capture fisheries sectors of the economy (Phak, 2016). Yet after a long period of 
uncertainty regarding a market for the power generated by the dam, in 2016 with 
record low water levels on the Mekong causing negative impacts to reliant riverside 
communities, Hun Sen stepped up to offer a strong public endorsement of the pro-
ject, shortly after it was announced that the Malaysian developer had done a deal 
with Cambodia (Khuon Narim, 2016). During a visit to the dam site in January 2017, 
he cordially thanked the Laos government “for selling cheap electricity to Cambodia” 
(Van Roeun, 2017). The Prime Minister, in echoes of the hydro-meteorological pro-
nouncements of Thailand’s King Bhumibol (Blake, 2015), pronounced that unusual 
water level changes had nothing to do with mainstream dams, but were instead the 
result of a capricious climate (Khuon Narim, 2016). 
It was significant that Mega First Corporation Berhad, the Malaysian company 
developing Don Sahong with reportedly no prior experience of dam development, 
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invited Sinohydro Corporation to become the main contractor (Banktrack, 2016). 
It is unlikely to be coincidence that since the construction of the Lower Se San 2 
(LS2) hydropower project began in 2014 (see section below for further details), the 
Cambodian government has tried to kickstart two highly controversial Mekong 
mainstream mega-dam projects downstream of Don Sahong, namely the Stung Treng 
and Sambor projects, that were previously no more than dormant plans with little 
international support (Peter & Ben, 2017). Like LS2, both proposed Mekong projects 
are under the control of the Royal Group, in association with Chinese state enter-
prise partners providing finance and technical capability (International Rivers, 2017). 
The proposed 2,600 MW Sambor hydropower project is seen by external analysts as 
having the most destructive potential of all the mainstream dams planned, due to 
its sheer size, impact on flows, and ability to block irreplaceable fish migrations at a 
critical point of the entire lower Mekong ecosystem (ICEM, 2010; National Heritage 
Institute, 2017). If constructed at full-scale,8 it would lead to the resettlement of 
approximately 20,000 people, diminish the livelihoods of hundreds of thousands 
more in Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam, and likely lead to the extirpation of 
the Mekong’s last population of endangered Irrawaddy dolphins (Peter & Ben, 2017). 
THE ROLE OF CHINA IN EXPORTING A HYDRAULIC SOCIETY MODEL TO SATELLITE 
STATES
China, as the world’s foremost dam building nation (World Commission on Dams, 
2000), is considered the pre-eminent promoter of large dam schemes abroad. Chinese 
companies are said to be involved in 360 dams in 74 countries, and an estimated 
39% of these projects are overseen by a single company (Sinohydro Corporation) 
(Yeophantong, 2016). Since the ascension of Xi Jinping to China’s “paramount leader” 
in 2012, there has been a redirection of China’s foreign policy, with Global South 
nations, including Cambodia, becoming enthusiastic recipients of the Chinese gov-
ernment’s expanding penchant for overseas infrastructure construction (Caceres & 
Ear, 2013; Schaffar, 2018), much of it placed under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). 
Regionally, this has been interpreted as a sign of Beijing’s strategy of “peripheral 
diplomacy” (Callahan, 2016), or alternatively, part of a “regional soft-power offensive” 
southwards to ASEAN countries (Yeophantong, 2016); though neither of these terms 
adequately captures the extent to which infrastructure specifically can be used as a 
tool of interstate “technopolitics” (see Sneddon, 2015, for a study of the United States 
of America’s own dam diplomacy attempts during the Cold War era). Since the turn 
of the 21st century, there has been significant investment channeled to Cambodia 
for implementing a range of hydraulic infrastructure projects by Chinese state-run 
companies, in the form of Official Direct Assistance (ODA) grants, subsidies, and soft 
loans, usually given with few conditions compared to those demanded by Western 
nations (Harris, 2016; Heng, 2012; Siciliano et al., 2016). For example, at the opening 
ceremony of the Chinese-funded and built Kirirom-III hydropower project in Koh 
Kong province in February 2013, Hun Sen (2013b) lauded that one of the advantages 
8 It should be noted that there are several possible design proposals under consideration, some less envi-
ronmentally destructive than the original design, following the US-based Natural Heritage Institute (2017) 
being hired by the Ministry of Mines and Energy to study alternatives. 
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of Chinese investment was that it did not come with onerous debt terms for the 
Cambodian government to bear and that the projects all met their deadlines because 
they were well financed, with the backing of the Bank of China, thus helping Chinese-
Cambodian relations reach “a new stage”. 
Chinese investments have included the construction of numerous large 
non-hydraulic infrastructure projects, including Special Economic Zones (SEZs), 
airports, ports (Sihanoukville being the largest), highways, IT networks, electric-
ity distribution networks, and agri-business investments, including large and 
controversial Economic Land Concessions (ELCs) (Sok Serey, 2017). One estimate 
calculated that between 1994 and 2012, China had invested a total of USD 9.17 bil-
lion in Cambodia, and Chinese companies consistently head tables of foreign direct 
investment (Sullivan, 2015). Another source, citing the official website of the Chinese 
embassy in Phnom Penh, claimed that 80% of all power produced in Cambodia was 
provided by Chinese companies in 2016, with investment totaling USD 2.4 billion in 
seven plants built over the last decade (Kawase, 2017). 
At a speech delivered at the opening of a March 2016 conference in Phnom 
Penh entitled “Getting Things Moving – Regional and National Infrastructure and 
Logistics for Connectivity, Growth and Development”, Hun Sen stressed that the 
Royal Government of Cambodia’s priorities were developing “roads, water, electricity 
and human” resource sectors in the national development strategy, as part of a move 
to improve regional connectivity and integration (Hun Sen, 2016). He welcomed the 
establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the Silk Road 
Fund as key sources of finance in supporting the nation’s infrastructure investment 
plans.9 Indeed, Cambodia has become a near model client state for China in recent 
years, both in terms of facilitating Chinese investment in Cambodia and in support-
ing its foreign policy goals in Southeast Asia. Hun Sen met with Chinese premier Xi 
Jinping twice in 2017, reinforcing a close bond of friendship between the two. As the 
China Daily reported, “Xi called Hun Sen a good friend, old friend and true friend 
of the CPC and the Chinese people”, noting that “Cambodia always firmly supports 
China on issues concerning its core interests” (Xinhua, 2017).
A prime example of the support offered by Cambodia towards China’s “core inter-
ests” was provided in 2012 when the Cambodian government, acting as rotating chair 
of ASEAN, prevented the foreign ministers of ASEAN countries from issuing a joint 
communiqué expressing concerns about the Chinese annexation of large swathes of 
the South China Sea, arguing that this was merely a bilateral issue between China and 
the countries concerned (Kawase, 2017). The interference caused a significant degree 
of friction within ASEAN at the time, as all the claimants of the disputed maritime 
areas are other ASEAN nations and stood to lose considerable resource right claims. 
Cambodia has proven a staunch supporter of China’s one-country policy by recognizing 
its territorial claims over Taiwan, while offering up its strategic port of Sihanoukville 
to significant Chinese investment (Sullivan, 2015), including the construction of a new 
highway between the port and the capital. The apparent advantages to Hun Sen nur-
turing a cosy relationship with China over more onerous and less generous aid terms 
9 According to a 2017 conference on resilient infrastructure, 70% of Cambodia’s roads have been 
financed by China (Open Development Cambodia, 2015).
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required by Western governments were once more apparent at the Mekong-Lancang 
Cooperation (MLC) Summit, held in Phnom Penh on 10-11 January 2018. At the end of 
the summit, the Chinese premier Li Kequiang “signed 20 new development agreements 
with host Cambodia worth several billion dollars”, while simultaneously stressing “the 
MLC’s firm commitment to non-interference in other members internal affairs” as 
part of a “Phnom Penh Declaration” and prerequisite to a five year action plan (Hutt, 
2018; see also Nachemson, 2018). Insisting that Cambodia would never allow a for-
eign country to interfere in its internal affairs, Hun Sen insisted at a February 2019 
ground-breaking ceremony for a USD 50 million Chinese-funded hospital, “China’s 
approach to foreign policy is that it does not want to control any countries [sic]. China 
only wants to develop friendships around the world” (Lipes, 2019). 
The author contends that an important aspect of the deepening bilateral rela-
tionship between the two states is Cambodia’s emergence as a satellite or peripheral 
hydraulic state of China, adding a new dimension to the hydraulic society hypoth-
esis. This is manifested by the numerous, but rather opaque, Chinese-funded 
hydropower and irrigation schemes steadily appearing that are fundamentally alter-
ing the socio-natural landscape in a manner not seen since the Khmer Rouge era. 
According to Macan Markar (2013), Chinese investment in hydropower projects 
in Cambodia amounted to USD 1.6 billion in 2013 and was described as, “the most 
potent symbol of bilateral ties between the two countries”. The largest and most con-
troversial of the schemes constructed thus far has been the USD 816 million LS2 
hydropower project in northeast Cambodia, built by a consortium including China’s 
Hydrolancang International Energy Co. Ltd. (51% share), the Royal Group (39% 
share), and Electricity of Vietnam International Joint Stock Company (Harris, 2016). 
Construction commenced in 2014, and the controversial 400 MW installed capacity 
hydropower project was completed in December 2018, with a grand opening cere-
mony attended by Hun Sen (Soth Komsoeun, 2018). Financing for the project has 
reportedly come from shareholder company capital (30%) and an undisclosed loan 
from a Chinese bank (70%), believed to be the China Development Bank (Banktrack, 
n.d.). Some 4,800 people were resettled for the project’s reservoir, and a further 
80,000 people could be affected through loss of migratory fisheries and other envi-
ronmental impacts. Much domestic and international criticism has been directed 
against the developers for inadequate levels of compensation and rights afforded to 
affected communities (Harris, 2016), while several villager and NGO protests have 
been violently suppressed by state forces. However, the criticism seems to have made 
little difference to the eventual outcome. The chairman of the Royal Group, Kith 
Meng, controls extensive banking and business interests and is known to have close 
links to Hun Sen (Powell, 2011). 
Besides LS2, China has been involved in the construction of at least seven large 
dams in Cambodia, including the 194 MW Kamchay hydropower project in Kampot 
province developed by Sinohydro; the 18MW Kirirom III hydropower project in 
Koh Kong province developed by State Grid Xin Yuan company; the 338 MW Lower 
Russei Chrum hydropower project in Koh Kong province; the 246 MW Stung Tatay 
hydropower project developed by China National Heavy Machinery; the 120 MW 
Stung Atay hydropower project in Pursat province developed by Datang Corporation; 
and the 12 MW Kirirom I hydropower project in Kompong Speu province, developed 
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by China Electric Power Technology Import and Export Corporation, a subsidiary of 
the State Grid Corporation of China (Grimsditch, 2012). In addition to these existing 
projects, other Chinese corporations exploring the potential of developing further 
hydropower schemes in Cambodia include China Gezhouba Group Corporation, 
Huadian, China Southern Power Grid, and China Guodian Corporation (Grimsditch, 
2012). 
To take one example from the above list, the Kamchay dam built between 2006 
and 2011 by Sinohydro at an estimated cost of USD 311 million was financed by the 
China ExIm Bank as part of a USD 600 million aid, trade, and investment package 
extended to Cambodia. The project was “strongly supported and driven forward 
by the Cambodian Prime Minister” (Siciliano et al., 2016, p. 3) and became the first 
of a series of large dams built with Chinese money. Indeed, the dam was officially 
opened by Hun Sen in December 2011, the same year that China and Cambodia deep-
ened bilateral relations with a “comprehensive strategic partnership of cooperation” 
(Sullivan, 2015, p. 123). On the basis of fieldwork conducted around the dam site and 
stakeholder interviews, Siciliano et al. (2016) conclude that within Cambodia, “the 
political alliance at the top level crushes much opposition or concerns at the local 
level” (p. 13). They note that while local people had suffered immediate and perpet-
ual losses of livelihood and access to natural resources as a result of the Kamchay 
dam, mostly uncompensated, the developers would receive potential benefits from 
electricity revenue over 44 years under a Build, Operate, Transfer (BOT) agreement. 
There appeared to be a singular lack of communication between Sinohydro and rele-
vant bureaucracies on the one hand and impacted persons on the other hand at each 
stage of planning, construction, and operation, including sudden releases of water 
leading to downstream flooding, probably reflecting the inter-elite nature of this pro-
ject and prevailing power inequities in Cambodia (Siciliano et al., 2016).
Beyond Hydropower – Chinese-Funded Irrigation Development Schemes
Beyond the hydropower sector, China has also been the major bilateral aid donor and 
source of loans for irrigation development by a significant margin. After the transport 
sector, irrigation infrastructure accounted for the second largest target of state funds 
between 2008 and 2012, with much of the funds being channeled towards constit-
uencies that support the CPP (Blake, 2019). A list of agricultural water management 
sector infrastructure projects derived from an Asian Development Bank Inception 
Report suggested that China had loaned USD 601 million on seven projects for the 
period from 2010 to 2015, putting it far ahead of all other bilateral and multilateral 
aid donors involved in the sector (Pech et al., 2013). This sum included a purported 
USD 260 million figure for constructing two phases of the Vaico River Irrigation 
Development Project in eastern Cambodia,10 supposedly completed in 2015 but 
which was in a non-operational mode when the author visited the area in March 2017 
(Blake, 2017) and again in July 2018 (Blake, 2018b). This project was built to supply 
irrigation to a large area of poor-quality land in an area that does not drain well in the 
10 The project was awarded to Guangdong Foreign Construction Co. with the Cambodian government 
securing a reported concessionary loan from the Export-Import Bank of China. It has a targeted irrigation 
command area of 300,000 ha across Prey Veng, Svay Rieng and Kampong Cham provinces (Blake, 2017).
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wet season and was deemed “marginally suitable” or “not suitable” for irrigated agri-
culture investment by a Western consultant’s report in the early 1990s (Blake, 2017). 
The field visits revealed that not a single hectare of land has been irrigated by the 
scheme, despite the digging of a reported 78 km of canals and associated hydraulic 
infrastructure, pointing to a fundamental technical design flaw by the joint Chinese 
designers and Cambodian bureaucratic agencies involved. Despite the outright fail-
ure of Cambodia’s most extensive and expensive irrigation scheme, tellingly there has 
been no discernible outcry from domestic civil society, academia, or the media. While 
Western-funded irrigation schemes elsewhere have also suffered from abandoned, 
non-functional, or partially-functional infrastructure over many years and attracted 
some criticism as a result (Blake, 2019; Treffner, 2010), the Vaico project represents 
the most striking example of a transnational cultural gifting phenomenon that ben-
efits few beyond national elites, but harms many. That it is being implemented in 
plain sight (a brief reconnoiter of the relevant Google satellite image of Prey Veng is 
instructive) yet simultaneously obscured from public view or discussion, points to a 
cowed populace fearful of retribution should they speak out against such monumen-
tal examples of environmental destruction, corruption, and official ineptitude. 
CONCENTRATING POWER THROUGH HYDRAULIC MODES OF GOVERNANCE
The consequences of this remarkably rapid hydraulic infrastructure development tra-
jectory have been profound and have been felt beyond the geographical limits of the 
individual projects themselves to affect state-society relations from local to national 
levels. This is a result of both the concentration of wealth and political power that the 
hydraulic development paradigm enables amongst elites, but also due to the altered 
characteristics of Cambodia’s party-state machinery and associated centralization of 
bureaucratic power, now under the control of a single tyrannical ruler similar to that 
envisaged by Wittfogel. Hydraulic infrastructure, in particular large-scale irrigation, 
offers potential opportunities to create order and stability through its re-configura-
tion of the rural landscape, a key concern of the Cambodian elite (Springer, 2009) and 
inherently recognized by Pol Pot and Chinese Maoist state backers during the Khmer 
Rouge period (Bultmann, 2012). There are now distinguishable similarities between 
some aspects of the Khmer Rouge ideological discourse over irrigation development 
and that of the present regime’s visions (Blake, 2019). 
As with the case of China and its “controlocracy” (Ringen, 2016), Cambodia now 
employs a two-tier system of socio-political control, with an interdependent bureau-
cratic state and single dominant party, where the state controls society and the CPP 
controls the state (Hutt, 2017). Each large-scale hydraulic project built offers multiple 
opportunities for the state to incorporate previously unrealized social engineering 
potential and subjectivization of marginalized peoples (Scott, 1998). Imposing a 
supposedly modernizing, technological solution, whether a hydropower dam, flood 
control project, or irrigation scheme on a river system allows for a fundamental 
reordering of society according to (dis)utopian, state-centric visions. This implies 
the forced mass movement of people from the reservoir footprint to resettlement 
sites, allowing for the imposition of state and expert-led development practices, 
processes, and propaganda that invariably leave those impacted considerably worse 
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off economically and socio-culturally more impoverished than before (see Scudder, 
2019, for examples from across the developing world). The administrative gridlines 
that water control, irrigation canals, and parallel roads create, provide enhanced 
opportunities for authoritarian states to more easily subjugate citizens in line with 
the will of the ruling elites, weakening any remnants of civil society in the process. It 
unfolds in a more hegemonic and less coercive manner than during the forced corvée 
labor parties of the Khmer Rouge era (Bultmann, 2012), but nevertheless still leads to 
the incapacitation of local initiative and suppression of opposition voices. 
Blake and Barney (2018), for example, document the case of the Theun-Hinboun 
hydropower dam, which became a vehicle for the increasingly authoritarian Lao state 
to impose its will and vision on subaltern peoples, described in terms of “structural 
injustice and slow violence”. There are strong parallels between the contempo-
rary socio-political paradigms of hydraulic infrastructure development in Laos and 
Cambodia. At the same time, there seems to be sufficient evidence to suggest that 
the open armed receipt by Hun Sen of significant amounts of Chinese development 
grants, loans, and technical assistance to construct numerous large-scale hydraulic 
infrastructure projects, conducted under a cloak of opacity, is pulling Cambodia away 
from traditional close links to Vietnam’s polity towards China’s embrace. China’s 
domestic approach to hydraulic development has always been to first attend to the 
construction of infrastructure on a grand scale, which has allowed for the exertion of 
greater social control and bureaucratization from the center, leaving concerns about 
actual demand for water or electricity to later. This has led to the vast over-supply 
of hydropower capacity such as that currently found in Yunnan (Kynge & Hornby, 
2018). China seems to currently export this development model to other countries 
and, creating satellite hydraulic states in the process. 
CONCLUSION
This article has argued that Cambodia is tending towards certain characteristics 
that resemble a modern variant of a hydraulic society, in particular the rise of an 
unashamedly autocratic ruler directing the workings of a state that is increasingly 
organized along hydraulic lines. Cambodia clearly does not exhibit a typical hydraulic 
core configuration, as found in a number of other classical hydraulic societies, which 
were established in discrete arid or semi-arid large river basins. The topography, cli-
mate, and hydrology of Cambodia are significantly different from that found in the 
ancient hydraulic societies, but rather the landscape lends itself to what Wittfogel 
(1981) termed “hydro-agriculture” (p. 3), with most agriculture relying on rainfed and 
flood recession conditions. However, in Cambodia’s case these limitations have not 
formed an obstacle to the whims of an aspiring hydraulic ruler wanting to (re-)create 
a hydraulic society, buoyed on by the influence and technological assistance of an 
expansionist Chinese hydraulic state and nationalist visions of past Khmer greatness. 
Indeed, the inherent geo-physical limitations help to explain the failure of a series of 
large-scale irrigational developments, spectacularly demonstrated again by the Vaico 
river project. By adopting a ruthless approach that has virtually destroyed all internal 
opposition, Hun Sen now commands the state polity in a similar manner to past 
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rulers of classical hydraulic societies. Examples such as the Se San 2 and Vaico pro-
jects, where local people impacted are cowed by fear to protest, tend to confirm one 
of Wittfogel’s (1981) key observations concerning the despotic nature of the ruling 
class of hydraulic states and a corresponding weakened civil society, described as a 
“beggar’s democracy” (p. 108). Without a doubt, he has attained supreme operational 
authority over the nation and demonstrated Machiavellian adroitness by deepening 
control of the most important institutions of statecraft.
Morgenbesser (2018b) has described Hun Sen’s Cambodia as a “party-personalist 
dictatorship”, a state of affairs that recognized the ruler’s tendency towards an autoc-
racy that relies on the complete dominance of the CPP. As I have argued, such an 
analysis overlooks the hydraulic control dimensions of this style of statesmanship, 
which is best accounted for through Wittfogel’s hydraulic society hypothesis. The 
Cambodian government has over a relatively short period of time allocated escalating 
resources for the construction of grandiose hydraulic infrastructure projects, which 
in many instances are designed, bankrolled, and constructed by Chinese state-owned 
enterprises, with the implicit (and occasional explicit) benediction of Hun Sen and Xi 
Jinping. Whether Hun Sen or his immediate family have directly profited from the mas-
sive Chinese investment in such projects over the last decade can only be speculated 
upon due to the opacity surrounding the finances of such deals conducted between 
secretive regimes. Thus, this article may be seen as tentatively contributing to a more 
nuanced understanding of Wittfogel’s hypothesis in the light of recent geopolitical 
developments where a weak state has fallen into the patron-client orbit of a deeply 
entrenched and powerful hydraulic state to emerge as a new form of hydraulic society 
on the periphery. This contention is worth further investigation in future research.
While the lines between authoritarianism, autocracy, and despotism are patently 
blurred, it is apparent that many of the concrete actions taken by the Hun Sen regime 
in the last few years reflect an autocratic tendency to centralize control and destroy 
any credible political opposition, including rivals within the ranks of the CPP. The 
last two years have demonstrated that Hun Sen’s firebrand public rhetoric is fre-
quently matched by violent and coercive actions, leading to a severely diminished 
civil space in Cambodian politics, replaced by fear and self-censorship amongst its 
citizens. However, while Hun Sen closely resembles a Wittfogelian hydraulic despot 
and is being helped in this quest by the actions of China, this does not imply that 
Cambodia is or ever will be a strong hydraulic state, as it lacks the necessary basic 
environmental conditions. At best, it can function as a weak, satellite hydraulic state 
under the ultimate suzerainty of China, which will continue to dominate Cambodia 
at the expense of any former influence exerted by Western states and Vietnam, as 
altered geopolitical poles reflect new hegemonic realities.

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